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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AGAIN-R.I.P. OR
A GHOST THAT STILL WALKS?
BERNARD SCHWARTZ*
INTRODUCTION
(oH4O is there who has not felt a sudden startled pang at reliving
VVan old experience or feeling an old emotion? Y" have done this
before....' , A legal commentator all too often has the same feeling of
deja vu. This is the third article I have written on National League of
Cities v. Usery.2 The first analyzed the case's possible impact not long
after the Supreme Court decision was rendered.3 The second, a 1983
assessment of the post-National League of Cities jurisprudence, was trig-
gered primarily by the decision earlier that year in EEOC v. Wyoming.4
This third article is prompted by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,5 in which the Court flatly overruled National League
of Cities.
My natural reluctance to write once again on the same subject is out-
weighed by the importance of the Garcia decision. National League of
Cities appeared to be a constitutional landmark which drastically altered
the relationship between federal and state power.6 Its overruling is an
event of equal significance, the implications of which deserve at least as
much comment as National League of Cities itself.
This Article contains five principal sections. Part I discusses the deci-
sion in National League of Cities. Part II analyzes the cases applying
National League of Cities. The Garcia decision will be examined in Part
III and critiqued in Part IV. Finally, Part V concludes that the Garcia
Court's abdication of judicial review should be repudiated.
I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
The natural starting point for any discussion of the Garcia decision
and its impact is the case it overruled. At issue in National League of
* Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The
author acknowledges the generous support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E.
Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law.
1. Agatha Christie, Curtain 1 (1975) (emphasis in original).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. See Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and
State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1115 (1978).
4. 460 U.S. 226 (1983); see Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery Revisited-
Is the Quondam Constitutional Mountain Turning Out to Be Only a Judicial Molehill?, 52
Fordham L. Rev. 329 (1983).
5. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
6. See eg., Heldt, The Tenth Amendment Iceberg, 30 Hastings LJ. 1763, 1764-65
(1979) (National League of Cities only "tip of a tenth amendment iceberg"); Percy, Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth Amendment Is Alive and Doing Well, 51 Tul.
L. Rev. 95, 106 (1976) (National League of Cities is "momentous" decision).
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Cities were the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974.7 The
amendments broadened the coverage of the original 1938 Act8 by ex-
tending it to the states, thus making federal minimum wage and hour
requirements applicable to state and local government employees. 9 The
Court ruled the extension invalid, holding that Congress could not im-
pose on the states wage and hour requirements previously imposed on
private employers.' 0 The fact that the commerce power clearly covered
employment conditions of comparable private employees was not deter-
minative. 1 The Court sharply distinguished federal regulation of private
employment from federal regulation of public employment' 2 and noted
that decisions establishing the breadth of congressional authority under
the commerce clause had involved laws regulating private individuals
and businesses.' 3 A different situation exists when Congress seeks to ex-
ercise the commerce power in a manner infringing on the states' exist-
ence as essential elements of the federal system: "[T]here are limits upon
the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercis-
ing its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which
are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution."' 4
Under National League of Cities, congressional authority under the
commerce clause does not include regulation "directed ... to the States
as States."'" The states are immune from federal control in the perform-
ance of their governmental activities. 6 The challenged provision vio-
lated this immunity by directly supplanting the choices of the states on
their employment policies. 7 Congress may not exercise its commerce
clause authority so as to impair the states' ability to function effectively
as separate and independent entities-a concept that is implicit in the
federal system embodied in the Constitution.'
7. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1982)).
8. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-150, 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (99 Stat.) 787).
9. The definition of employer in the Act was broadened to include a "public
agency." See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982). A public agency was defined as
the Government of the United States; the government of a State or political
subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States (including the United
States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a political subdi-
vision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency.
Id. § 203(x).
10. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
11. See id. at 837, 840-41.
12. See id. at 840-41, 845.
13. Id. at 840-41.
14. Id. at 842.
15. Id. at 845.
16. As the Court noted, "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
government which may not be impaired by Congress... because the Constitution prohib-
its it from exercising the authority in that manner." Id.
17. Id. at 845-52.
18. Id. at 852.
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To comprehend the impact of National League of Cities, one must un-
derstand the manner in which the Supreme Court had exercised its role
as arbiter of federalism in the years before that decision. The Court's
role in this respect is, of course, one that it has exercised from the begin-
ning of our constitutional system.' 9 At the same time, it can hardly be
gainsaid that the manner in which that role has been performed has been
drastically altered in recent years. "It is," in the words of Justice Jack-
son, "undeniable that.., we have been in a cycle of rapid centralization,
and Court opinions have sanctioned a considerable concentration of
power in the Federal Government with a corresponding diminution in
the authority and prestige of state governments."20 In the first part of
our history, the Supreme Court attempted to maintain an equal poise
between federal and state authority;21 more recently, it has tended to
place ever-increasing weight on the federal side of the balance.' Federal
authority can be exerted today even in areas that were formerly perceived
as purely within the competence of the states.23 Few, if any, activities are
now deemed so local as to be beyond the expanded reach which the
Court has given to congressional commerce power: "If it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch," declared the Court colloquially in 1949,
"it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.
'
"24
Prior to National League of Cities, the Supreme Court had all but
overturned previous limitations on the exercise of federal authority,"
19. See B. Schwartz, American Constitutional Law 10-11 (1955); see generally R.
Moschzisker, Judicial Review of Legislation (1971) (system ofjudicial review intended by
those who wrote and adopted the Constitution).
20. R. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 65-66
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Jackson I].
21. This balance has often been termed "dual sovereignty" and has been defined by
Professor Corwin:
It is the theory of two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power,
the governmental occupants of which confront each other as equals .... '[A]s
the Constitution itself does not draw the line, the question is necessarily one for
judicial decision.'
E. Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights 135 (1936) (quoting Chief Justice
Taney); see B. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 164-65.
22. See B. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 167-70; cf. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 847-48 (1979) ("From 1936 to
1976 Congress determined the allocation of governmental power in the federal system
virtually without judicial interference.").
23. See infra note 25.
24. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
25. Even purely intrastate activities are viewed as proper subjects for congressional
regulation under the commerce clause, as long as such actions affect interstate commerce.
See eg., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964) (activities of local res-
taurant affected interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (operation of local hotel affected interstate commerce); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-19, 127-29 (1942) (quotas on wheat produced solely for
consumption on farm valid under commerce clause); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 113-15 (1941) (goods produced intrastate under substandard labor conditions are
subject to regulation under the commerce clause); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1119-20
(effect of local activities on commerce need not be substantial to bring those activities
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prompting observers to ask whether the federal system might be replaced
by a unitary government in which the states would be reduced to mere
appendages.26 If the states still had "something of the magic of Athens
and of Rome,"27 perhaps they were also fated to share the ultimate
destiny of those once-vital polities, at least in regard to the reality of
governmental power.
The National League of Cities decision appeared to change this. For
the first time since the 1930's, the Court struck down an exercise of con-
gressional power under the commerce clause,28 and it did so on the
ground that the federal statute at issue invalidly impinged on the opera-
tion of the states as coordinate independent governments. If anything
seemed inconsistent with the past four and one half decades of concentra-
tion of authority in the federal government, it was the notion that the
states retain the attributes of sovereignty. Now the Supreme Court itself
relied on "traditional aspects of state sovereignty" 2 9 to invalidate a fed-
eral statute. What Justice Brennan termed "the newly announced 'state
sovereignty' doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery" 30 seemed to
signal an entirely new approach to what Woodrow Wilson called the car-
dinal question of our time-"[tlhe question of the relation of the States to
the federal government.
31
II. POST-NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES CASES
In EEOC v. Wyoming,32 the Court explained the decision in National
League of Cities:
National League of Cities was grounded on a concern that the imposi-
tion of certain federal regulations on state governments might, if left
unchecked, 'allow "the National Government [to] devour the essen-
within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause); see also Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even activity that is purely intrastate in charac-
ter may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by
others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.").
26. See Heldt, supra note 6, at 1764 ("The states have seemed destined to become
mere administrators of federal programs and regulations, a convenience of the federal
government much as municipal corporations are an administrative convenience of the
states.").
27. H. Laski, The American Democracy 139 (1948).
28. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04, 308-10 (1936). It should be
pointed out, however, that in certain situations the Court has adopted a narrow reading
of a statute in order to avoid an interpretation that might run afoul of the commerce
clause. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811-12 (1971) (Travel Act cannot
be used to punish those who run a gambling establishment in Florida); United States v.
Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 443-45, 451-52 (1953) (statute requiring dealers in
gambling devices to register interpreted as requiring some connection to interstate
commerce).
29. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849.
30. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 822 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
31. W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 173 (1911).
32. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
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tials of state sovereignty,"' .... It therefore drew from the Tenth
Amendment an 'affirmative limitation on the exercise of [congressional
power under the Commerce Clause] akin to other commerce power
affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution.'
33
National League of Cities was intended to prevent "undue federal in-
terference in certain core state functions."31 "In National League of Cit-
ies... the Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship
with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.'...
Yet... National League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects of a
State's sovereign authority are immune from federal control. 3a National
League of Cities did not specify what federal interferences came within its
constitutional ban. An attempt to fill this gap was made in the post-
National League of Cities jurisprudence---at least prior to the Garcia
case. The Court developed a three-prong test to determine whether a
federal regulation directed to the states was valid:
'[T1o succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation
is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy
each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the
challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal
regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of
state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." ,36
The post-National League of Cities cases did not deal with the second
prong of this test37 and it is not clear precisely what the Court meant by
33. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 236 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
841 (1976)) (brackets in original).
34. Id.
35. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 n.28
(1982).
36. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 237 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)) (emphasis in original); see Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88.
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), the
Court pointed to the existence of a fourth condition: a national interest which overrides
competing state interests. See id. at 1011; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. This final factor
requires a balancing test and was drawn from Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Na-
tional League of Cities. "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that
it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as envi-
ronmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state
facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Although men-
tioned by the Court in several opinions, see, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 n.9 (1982), the balancing factor has not been used, except in
dictum in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). The Court based its holding in
EEOC on a failure to satisfy the third prong of National League of Cities See EEOC, 460
U.S. at 238-39. It noted, however, that the federal interest in the legislation at issue
might require a finding "that the nature of that interest 'justifies state submission.'" Id.
at 242-43 n. 17.
37. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Court stated that the second
1985]
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an "'undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.' "38 The first and third
prongs were, however, the subjects of Supreme Court decisions.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association39 was the
key case interpreting the first prong. The statute at issue in Hodel estab-
lished federal standards for surface mining operations.4" This statute did
not meet the first prong's requirement because it did not regulate states,
but "only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individu-
als and businesses. '41 The fact that the federal law may have preempted
state regulatory laws did not change the result. A federal law displacing
state regulation of private businesses does not constitute the required reg-
ulation of a state as a state.42
The third prong of the test used in applying National League of Cities
had two aspects: the federal law must directly impair the states' ability
1) to structure integral operations, 2) in areas of traditional governmental
functions.43 National League of Cities explained the second aspect by
saying that its holding applied to "those governmental services which the
States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their
citizens."'  According to the Court, this requirement was not met in
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road.45
The Long Island Rail Road was a commuter line owned and operated
by New York State, which had acquired it in 1966.46 A state law prohi-
bited strikes by public employees,47 while a federal law permitted rail-
road employees to strike after mediation efforts failed to resolve a labor
dispute.48 After negotiations and mediation efforts failed, the union sued
for a declaratory judgment that the labor dispute was governed by the
federal law.49 That raised the further question of whether the federal law
could constitutionally be applied to a state-owned railroad. In such a
case, was the federal law an unconstitutional intrusion on state autonomy
under National League of Cities because it interfered with the state's pol-
icy of prohibiting strikes by its employees?
The Supreme Court said no, stating that the key issue was whether the
federal law impaired the state's authority with respect to" 'areas of tradi-
prong had posed "difficulties," id. at 237-38, and that cases after National League of
Cities had done little "to amplify on our understanding of the concept." Id. at 238 n. 11.
38. Id. at 238 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976)).
39. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
40. Id. at 268-72.
41. Id. at 288.
42. Id. at 289-90.
43. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976); see EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226, 237 (1983); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
44. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855.
45. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
46. Id. at 680.
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tional [state] functions.' "' The Court concluded it did not. In this
country, operation of railroads "has traditionally been a function of pri-
vate industry, not state or local governments."'" State control of some
railroads in recent years "does not alter the historical reality that the
operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed
by state and local governments. Federal regulation of state-owned rail-
roads simply does not impair a state's ability to function as a state."152
In EEOC v. Wyoming,53 however, the Court held that the "manage-
ment of state parks is clearly a traditional state function."'  Despite this,
the Court sustained a federal law prohibiting compulsory retirement of
state park employees because of age.55 The federal statute at issue 56 pro-
hibited employment discrimination against workers between the ages of
forty and seventy "except 'where age is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation'" for the given job. 7 In 1974, Congress extended the law to the
states acting as employers. 8 Wyoming had a statute permitting the state
to retire game wardens at age fifty-five. 59 The state claimed that the 1974
law violated the principles laid down in National League of Cities. The
Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the extension of the federal statute
to the states.60
The Court recognized the management of state parks as a traditional
state function. 61 Nevertheless, it held that the third prong of the Na-
tional League of Cities test was not met because the federal law was not
one which "directly impairs the States' ability to structure their integral
operations."62 The statute at issue in National League of Cities had a
drastic financial effect; it forced the states to pay their workers a mini-
mum wage and an overtime rate that would leave less money for other
state programs. 3 In EEOC, there was no such effect. The state could
pay its workers exactly what it would have without the federal law.' 4 In
addition, the state could still assess the fitness of its game wardens and
dismiss those found unfit.65 Indeed, the federal law permitted the state to
continue its employment practice if it could "demonstrate that age is a
50. Id. at 684 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (brackets in original).
51. Id. at 686.
52. Id. (emphasis in original).
53. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
54. Id. at 239.
55. Id.
56. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)).
57. 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 234 & n.7.
60. Id. at 239.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 240; see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1976).
64. 460 U.S. at 241.
65. Id. at 239.
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'bona fide occupational qualification' for the job of game warden."66
Hence, the Court concluded, "the degree of federal intrusion in this case
is sufficiently less serious than it was in National League of Cities so as to
make it unnecessary for us to override Congress' express choice to extend
its regulatory authority to the States."'67
III. GARCIA V. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Justice Blackmun begins his majority opinion in Garcia by noting:
"We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National League of Cities v.
Usery." 68 The issue in Garcia was the application of the minimum-wage
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of
the publicly-owned mass transportation system in San Antonio. 69 The
system had been privately owned and operated until 1959, when it was
purchased by the city, which subsequently transferred ownership and op-
eration to appellee public authority. 70 Appellee had brought the original
action, seeking a determination that it was entitled to National League of
Cities immunity from the federal statute.71
To one familiar with post-National League of Cities jurisprudence,
Garcia appears to involve only a simple application of the Long Island
Rail Road decision. 72 But the district court saw the case differently. It
found that the San Antonio Transit Authority was performing a tradi-
tional state function and met all requisites for tenth amendment immu-
nity from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.73 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court remanded for re-
consideration in light of the recently-decided Long Island Rail Road
case. 74 On remand, the district court again granted judgment to the
transit authority: "Upon further consideration, this Court finds nothing
in LIRR that compels a change in its previous conclusion that operation
of a public transit system is a governmental function entitled to Tenth
Amendment immunity." 75
Three federal circuit courts and one state appellate court had reached
the opposite conclusion. 76 Thus, it would have been easy for the
Supreme Court simply to hold that Long Island Rail Road governed and
66. Id. at 240.
67. Id. at 239.
68. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985).
69. Id. at 1007-08.
70. Id. at 1007.
71. Id. at 1009.
72. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
73. See San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 446
(W.D. Tex. 1983) (district court citing its previous summary judgment decision in favor
of the transit authority), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
74. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
75. 557 F. Supp. 445, 446 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
76. See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 701 F.2d 50, 52-53 (6th
Cir. 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060, 1067-69 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 1391 (1985); Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308,
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that operation of a mass-transit system was not a "traditional govern-
mental function" and hence not exempt under National League of Cities
from a federal regulatory law." Instead, the Court by a bare majority
delivered a broadside decision overruling National League of Cities
itself.78
The Court's opinion gave two principal reasons for overruling Na-
tional League of Cities: 1) "the attempt to draw the boundaries of state
regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is
... unworkable" and 2) such an attempt is "inconsistent, with established
principles of federalism." 79
The conclusion that the "traditional function" test was unworkable
was based on an analysis of federal cases that had attempted to apply the
test.8 0 Justice Blackmun summarized the cases-both those holding par-
ticular functions to be protected under National League of Cities and
those reaching the opposite result.8" It was "difficult, if not impossible,
to identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first
group on one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on
the other side." 2 The result was the necessity of" 'identifying a tradi-
tional state function in the same way pornography is sometimes identi-
fied: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't describe it.' "83
Even more significant was Garcia's rejection of the underlying premise
of National League of Cities-that the principles of federalism impose
restrictions on the commerce clause and hence on the scope of congres-
sional regulatory authority vis-a-vis the states.84 National League of Cit-
ies assumed that there were limits on the federal government's power to
interfere with state functions and that the courts had to enforce those
limits.8 5 The Garcia opinion agreed that "the Constitution's federal
structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause."86 But it refused
309-10 (3d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Francis v. Tallahassee, 424 So.
2d 61, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
77. But see Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Municipal operation
of an intracity mass transit system] nevertheless is a classic example of the type of service
traditionally provided by local government.").
78. Id. at 1007.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1011.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1010 (quoting San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F.
Supp. 445, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)).
84. See infra notes 127-50 and accompanying text.
85. "This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress
to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or
to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution." National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842; see also id. at 852 ("Congress has attempted to exercise
its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours ....
[and] sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in a federal system.' ") (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
547 n.7 (1975)).
86. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016.
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to define those limitations and, more importantly, held that the remedy
for their violation was political, not judicial.87
National League of Cities had declared that limits on federal power
prohibit regulation interfering with "traditional aspects of state sover-
eignty."88 This led to the "traditional governmental functions" test89
that the Garcia opinion found so troublesome.90 Garcia rejected the view
that the courts could identify "principled constitutional limitations"91 on
the commerce power by relying on different attributes of state sover-
eignty. Indeed, according to Justice Blackmun, "the Constitution does
not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may
not employ its delegated powers to displace." 92 It is consequently not for
the courts "to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."93
Where does this leave the states' relationship to federal regulatory au-
thority? Even if the Constitution is inconsistent with the notion of state
sovereignty, there is no doubt that our federalism is based on the contin-
uance of the states as fully independent and autonomous governments. 94
State independence and autonomy are inconsistent with their complete
subjection to federal regulatory power. The Garcia Court does not disa-
gree with this; it expressly recognizes the emphasis of the framers on the
need "to ensure the role of the States in the federal system." 9 But it
breaks sharply with prior law by concluding that protecting the states
from improper exertions of federal regulatory authority is no longer a
judicial function. Instead, "the principal means.., to ensure the role of
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Gov-
ernment itself."96 That structure "was designed in large part to protect
the States from overreaching by Congress." '97 The states' representation
in Congress and their role in the selection of both the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal government are to be relied on to shield
their interests from undue federal invasion.98
87. Id. at 1020.
88. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849.
89. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016.
90. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
91. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016.
92. Id. at 1017.
93. Id.
94. "The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the
federal government." The Federalist No. 45, at 288 (J. Madison) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1899).
Madison further emphasized that the states held numerous and great powers, "ex-
tend[ing] to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosper-
ity of the State." Id. at 290; see also Kaden, supra note 22, at 852-53 (states left with
enormous discretionary powers).
95. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1018.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. For a general discussion of this view of the states' role in the federal govern-
ment, see Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
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The Court's ultimate conclusion is that the states must look to the
federal political process rather than to enforceable constitutional limita-
tions to protect them against undue congressional encroachment. "State
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power."99
Under Garcia the scope of Congress' authority over the states under
the commerce clause no longer presents any judicial question: "mhe
principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent
in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system pro-
vides through state participation in federal governmental action. The
political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not
be promulgated.""
IV. A GARCIA CRITIQUE
A. An Unworkable Test?
The first reason given in the Garcia opinion for overruling National
League of Cities is that the "traditional governmental functions" test is
unworkable.1 °1 However, mere difficulty in applying legal principles has
never been considered an adequate reason for abandoning those princi-
ples. Holmes' admonition against expecting legal rules to operate with
the precision of mathematical formulaet" 2 is particularly relevant in pub-
lic law: "[T]he luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in inter-
preting and applying the general provisions of our Constitution.""'  The
fact that courts have reached seemingly inconsistent results in applying
National League of Cities"°4 is not by itself enough to warrant overruling
that case. It is, after all, the job of the Supreme Court to reconcile differ-
ences in lower court results. Moreover, it is by no means as clear as the
Garcia opinion asserts that the federal courts were hopelessly divided in
their application of National League of Cities. The Court's assertion is
based on a list of cases which, in its view, reach inconsistent results. 05
As Justice Powell points out in his dissent, the cases listed by the Court
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 546-47
(1954); see also Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the Stater The Dispensa-
bility of Judicial Review, 86 Yale L.J. 1552, 1560-65 (1977) (states' rights are protected
through their representation in Congress and their role in selection of the President);
Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 603, 614 (1975) (actions of Congress reflect the balance between national and state
interest). For an exposition of the viewpoint that this traditional role of the states in the
federal government has broken down, see Kaden, supra note 22, at 860-67.
99. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1018.
100. Id. at 1020.
101. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
102. See O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
103. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. See infra notes 105-26 and accompanying text.
105. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011.
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do not, as it claims, demonstrate the impossibility of definition. Accord-
ing to Justice Powell, a number of the cases "simply do not involve the
problem of defining governmental functions." 106 Justice Powell cites two
cases to support this statement. 0 7 The first, an Eleventh Circuit case,
involved a mental health center operated by a non-profit corporation
which, according to the circuit court, was "structured similarly to most
private, non-profit institutions."'' 08 The court properly concluded that
the center was "not a state agency or a political subdivision of the
state" 109 and hence, under the Hodel case, was not within the first prong
of the test used in applying National League of Cities. The court then
stated expressly that this holding made it unnecessary to decide whether
the center was performing a function that was "traditional or
essential." 10
In the second case, the Second Circuit held that New York City had
waived its right to assert that enforcement of a transportation control
plan under the Clean Air Act"' violated the city's tenth amendment
rights under National League of Cities because the city failed to raise the
claim in its petition for review of the Environmental Protection Agency's
approval of the plan."12 The substitution of federal regulation for state
and local regulation, such as that involved in the plan promulgated under
the Clean Air Act, is similar to the Hodel situation. A federal regulation
displacing local regulation of private activities does not appear to involve
the regulation of "States as States."
Justice Powell also cited two other cases, among those listed by the
Garcia majority, as "not properly analyzed under the principles of Na-
tional League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the
lower courts.""' 3 The cases dealt with the questions of whether a federal
106. Id. at 1023 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 669 F.2d 671, 674 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
109. Id. at 679.
110. Id.
111. Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
112. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902
(1977). At issue in Friends of the Earth was the Clean Air Act, which contained a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme designed to protect public health. See id. at 29. The Act
established standards governing acceptable levels of air pollution. Id. State and local
governments were required to establish air quality programs to meet the federal stan-
dards, and submit plans to the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at 29-30. Failure
to submit a plan allowed the EPA to design and implement a substitute plan. Id. at 30.
The actual holding of the court was that the city had waived its rights to assert a tenth
amendment claim. See id. at 35. To the extent that the court pursued a National League
of Cities inquiry, it noted that enforcement of the plan would not entail "basic structural
changes" in city services and would not result in the kind of invasion into integral gov-
ernmental functions decried in National League of Cities. See id. at 38. However, the
court mainly focused on the "cooperative" nature of the plan, see id. at 37, and on the
state's voluntary enactment of the plan, see id., thus exercising "its sovereign powers to
make policy choices participated in by its citizens." Id. at 38.
113. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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magistrate could suspend a motorist's California driver's license for
drunk driving in a federal enclave in the state' 4 and whether a city mo-
nopoly for its solid waste recycling plant violated the Sherman Act.II5 In
both opinions, there was no need to reach the tenth amendment issue."I6
The mere fact that the courts chose to grapple with the question is not
enough to bring the cases within the ambit of National League of Cities.
Justice Powell's criticisms apply equally to three of the other cases
cited by the Garcia opinion. They, too, do not involve "the problem of
defining governmental functions" and hence do not rest on proper analy-
sis of NationalLeague of Cities.1 7 As to the remaining five cases listed in
114. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978).
115. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
116. In United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978), the court examined the
question of whether a federal magistrate could order the suspension of the defendant's
driver's license as punishment for a drunk driving conviction. The case turned on
whether suspension was penal or regulatory and the Ninth Circuit determined that Cali-
fornia viewed suspension as regulatory. See id. at 1100. Because the Assimilative Crimes
Act only allowed a federal court to use a state's penal laws, it could not carry out such a
regulatory decision. See id. The court, however, then went on to examine the case under
the principles of National League of Cities and determined that the suspension of the
driver's license violated the tenth amendment. See id. at 1102-03. This was not a neces-
sary basis for the decision, as the principles of National League of Cities should not have
been implicated. The action of a federal judge in suspending a driver's license is not
equivalent to direct legislation by Congress. Moreover, the judge's act has no impact on
allocation of resources by the State of California, a factor the Court pointed to in both
National League of Cities and EEOC. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 240-42
(1983); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-52 (1976).
In Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982), the court was faced with a dispute over a plan by the
city of Akron to establish a solid waste recycling plant. The plaintiffs, private waste
collectors, challenged the plan on a number of grounds, including a Sherman Act claim.
See id. at 1195. The court determined that the city's waste disposal program was valid
under the state action exemption to the Sherman Act. See id. The court then held that
the Sherman Act should not apply in any event, stating that given two such competing
goals, "Tenth Amendment values should not be narrowly read when Congress has not
expressly or by clear implication displaced a traditional exercise of local police power."
Id. at 1196. As with the Best case, it is apparent that a National League of Cities analysis
was peripheral to the case.
117. See Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334 (9th Cit. 1981)
(federal preemption of state regulation of air transportation), Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (whether Sherman Act infringes
on local regulation of ambulances), afl'd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1864 (1985); Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (federal preemption of natural gas regulation), af'd,
661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
In Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982),
aft'd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985), Kansas City
adopted an ambulance service ordinance which provided that only one company would
supply ambulance services for the city. Id. at 964-65. The court decided that this policy
was valid under the state action exemption to the antitrust laws. See id. at 967. As with
the Hybud Equipment case, the court then unnecessarily went on to decide the National
League of Cities issue.
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) and
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Garcia, they are not nearly as idiosyncratic as the majority opinion as-
serts. They do divide on whether the particular functions at issue are
traditional state functions under the National League of Cities test. But
those that hold that the functions involved are not entitled to National
League of Cities immunity1 8 appear consistent with the pre-Garcia
Supreme Court decisions, particularly the Long Island Rail Road case.
The same appears true of the decision holding that the Puerto Rico
Highway Authority is protected under National League of Cities, since
roads have traditionally been built and maintained by governments."19
Closer to the line is the Sixth Circuit case reaching the same result for
operation of a municipal airport;12° but it, too, deals with a function that
has long been assumed by government.'
After listing the cases, the Garcia opinion states that it is all but impos-
sible to find an organizing principle justifying the inconsistent decisions
reached: "The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and
regulating traffic, for example, or between operating a highway authority
and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best."' 22 Yet, as al-
ready shown, the cases involving drivers' licenses, 2 3 traffic regulation, 24
and operation of mental health centers'25 did not involve federal regula-
tion of "the States as States" at all. And the case concerning the Puerto
Rico Highway Authority' 26 may, as seen, be supported as a proper appli-
Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 494 F. Supp. 636
(W.D. Okla. 1980), affd, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105
(1982) both involved situations in which the federal government had complete preemp-
tion power in the area in question. Even though a National League of Cities analysis was
not necessary, the Derryberry court appeared to draw a proper line, explaining that the
power to regulate the production and sale of gas is not a traditional state function. See
494 F. Supp. at 657. "It is not the states' roles as providers of roads, education, and
similar traditional state functions which is [sic] infringed by the Act, but, if anything,
their choice of methods by which to fund such functions." Id.
118. See Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
1983) (domestic services for aged and handicapped); Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553
F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1977) (operation of telephone company); Woods v. Homes & Struc-
tures, 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980) (issuance of industrial development bonds that
benefit private companies which had previously issued them).
119. See Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1982).
The court, using a semi-historical approach, stated that "governments have built and
maintained roads from time immemorial," id. at 845, and pointed out that road building
is undertaken for the public welfare, not as a profit-making activity. See id.
120. See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
121. As a factual matter, the court declared that airports are almost always operated
by public entities and noted that only two airports in the country were operated by pri-
vate concerns. See id. at 1038 & n.7.
122. 105 S. Ct. at 1011.
123. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978).
124. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
902 (1977). The plan for controlling air pollution involved the regulation of traffic. Id. at
32 & n.6.
125. See Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 669 F.2d 671, 674 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
126. See Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth. 680 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1982).
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cation of the National League of Cities test.
B. Abnegation or Abdication?
The most far-reaching aspect of Garcia was its declaration of a hands-
off posture in cases involving claims of federal regulatory infringement
on the states. The announced policy of judicial abnegation stands in
striking contrast to the Court's traditional role as arbiter of the federal
system. Over the years it has ultimately been the Court that has kept the
balance between federal and state power 127 and it has done so regardless
of which level of government-state or federal-was performing the
claimed infringement.
Few today would disagree with the need for judicial review of state
action to ensure against violation of the national interests preserved by
the Constitution. Yet, not too long ago, the propriety of the judicial role
in protecting commerce against state infringements was questioned by
Justice Black. The commerce clause "means that Congress can regulate
commerce and that the courts cannot .... I think that whether state
legislation imposes an 'undue burden' on interstate commerce raises pure
questions of policy, which the Constitution intended should be resolved
by the Congress."' 8 In Justice Black's view, judicial condemnation of a
state law on the ground of repugnancy to the commerce clause is itself a
regulation of commerce and such regulation was given to Congress, not
the courts. 12 9
The Black position was based on the proposition that a judicial tribu-
nal is not qualified to make the economic judgments on which cases in-
volving alleged state transgressions of the commerce clause must be
based. Congress alone, Justice Black once stated, can not only consider
whether particular state legislation "is consistent with the best interests
of our national economy, but can also on the basis of full exploration of
the many aspects of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair
alike to the States and our Union."'' 30
As a practical matter, it is doubtful whether Congress could deal effec-
tively with the myriad of problems of state impediments to national
trade. Even if such an assembly could acquire the broad view and impar-
tiality necessary to resolve these matters, it is hard to see how it would
find the time, when it is now swamped by the pressures of its normal
legislative tasks. And where is the legislative department to acquire the
machinery and the personnel necessary to oversee such a program, in
order to deal speedily and effectively with cases of improper state action
as they arise?
127. See infra notes 130-50 and accompanying text.
128. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386-87 (1946) (Black, J., concurring).
129. See id. (Black, J., concurring); T. Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional
Interpretation 160 (1967).




Only the judicial process can deal effectively with these cases so as to
give immediate practical effect to the policy behind the commerce clause.
Justice Douglas aptly pointed this out some years ago. Speaking of state
barriers to commerce, he said: "Congress, of course, could have removed
those barriers and probably would have done so. But the judiciary has
moved with speed. As a result of the case by case approach, there has
been no great lag between the creation of the forbidden barrier or burden
and its removal by the judiciary."' 31
Certainly, it has been the American experience that fulfillment of a
policy such as that of the commerce clause must depend primarily on the
courts. In Justice Douglas' phrase, "Constitutions can say that com-
merce must be free; but over the years the courts will be largely the ones
who will implement these provisions." '32 The Supreme Court remains
the indispensable instrument for carrying out the negative aspect of the
commerce clause. As the Court itself expressed it, in a leading case spe-
cifically rejecting Justice Black's view: "[I]n such cases, where Congress
has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the com-
merce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and na-
tional interests."'' 33
The same can essentially be said about enforcing constitutional protec-
tions for the states against federal encroachments. The Garcia opinion
recognizes "that the States occupy a special and specific position in our
constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause must reflect that position."' 34 But Garcia holds that it
is not for the Court to define the affirmative limits imposed on federal
activity under the commerce clause.' 35 Instead it is for Congress alone to
define and enforce "the limits on Congress' authority to regulate the
States under the Commerce Clause."'136
Such an approach, like that of Justice Black to state power over com-
merce, flouts the basic principles of our constitutional law. Those princi-
ples rest on the fundamental proposition that it is for "the federal
judiciary 'to say what the law is' with respect to the constitutionality of
acts of Congress."'' 37 Provided that the tests of justiciability are met'
and that a political question is not presented 39 (and both conditions
were met in Garcia), it is for the courts "to say what the law is" on all
constitutional issues presented to them.
All political history shows us that a constitution is only a paper instru-
131. W. Douglas, We the Judges 254 (1956).
132. Id. at 255.
133. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
134. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 1016.
137. Id. at 1027 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
138. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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ment if it cannot be enforced by the courts. Addressing the court in the
Five Knights' Case (one of the great State Trials of Stuart England), the
Attorney General, arguing for the Crown, asked, "[S]hall any say, The
king cannot do this? No, we may only say, He will not do this."'" It
was precisely to ensure that, in our system, we would be able to say,
"The Government cannot do this" that the people enacted a written con-
stitution containing basic limits on the powers of government. Of what
avail would such limits be, however, if there were no legal machinery to
enforce them?
Without such machinery, our system would prove no more effective
than that set up under the Articles of Confederation. "Government itself
would be useless," as the first United States Attorney General said, "if a
pleasure to obey or transgress with impunity, should be substituted in the
place of a sanction to its laws. This was a just cause of complaint against
the deceased confederation."' 141
To avoid the weaknesses which had rendered the Confederation futile,
the Constitution must incorporate "a coercive principle" 4 -the only
question, one of the framers declared, was whether it should be "a coer-
cion of law, or a coercion of arms."'4' The provision of effective "coer-
cion of law" for enforcement of the Constitution has been the uniquely
American contribution to the science of government. "Force, which acts
upon the physical powers of man, or judicial process, which addresses
itself to his moral principles... are the only means to which govern-
ments can resort in the exercise of their authority. The former is happily
unknown to the genius of our constitution."' 144 For the ineffectiveness of
other constitutions whose violations could be censured only by force, we
have substituted the institution of judicial review.
Nor is it consistent with reality to urge, as is too often done, that the
true meaning of the Constitution is to have each branch as the final inter-
preter of its own constitutional powers. 4 Even the best of men can
hardly be trusted to act impartially as arbiters of their own authority.
140. Darnel's Case, [1627], reprinted in 3 A Complete Collection of State Trials 1, 45
(T. Howell ed. 1816). This case is traditionally known as the Fie Knights' Case.
141. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 422 (1793) (argument of Attorney
General Randolph).
142. 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 241 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
(remarks of Oliver Ellsworth).
143. Id.
144. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 363 (1816) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
145. This view was espoused by President Andrew Jackson, among others:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its
own opinion of the Constitution.... It is as much the duty of the House of
Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitu-
tionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or
approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for
judicial decision.
2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897 at 582 (J. Richardson ed. 1896) (Veto
Message to the Senate of Andrew Jackson). See R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial
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We need not necessarily agree with Lord Acton that great men are al-
most always bad men; 146 but our constitutional law should clearly be
based on such an assumption. Indeed, the whole organic structure has
been erected on the assumption that the king not only is capable of doing
wrong but is more likely to do wrong than other men if he is given the
opportunity.
Garcia's judicial abnegation ignores the dangers involved in entrusting
the political branches with the last word on the legality of their acts.
"More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's reasoning is
the result of its holding, i.e., that federal political officials, invoking the
Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of their own power.
This result is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our consti-
tutional system." '
Over a century and a half ago, Justice Story summed up this situation:
"The universal sense of America has decided, that in the last resort the
judiciary must decide upon the constitutionality of the acts and laws of
the general and state governments, so far as they are capable of being
made the subject of judicial controversy."'' 4 From the beginning, this
has been particularly true when federal and state power conflict."' Judi-
cial review has, indeed, always been the sine qua non of the federal struc-
ture. "So long, therefore, as this Constitution shall endure, this tribunal
must exist with it, deciding in the peaceful forms of judicial proceeding
the angry and irritating controversies between sovereignties, which in
other countries have been determined by the arbitrament of force.","
C. Beyond the Commerce Clause?
At issue in Garcia was a federal statute enacted under the commerce
clause. The implications of Garcia nevertheless go beyond infringements
on the states by laws enacted under the commerce power. The Garcia
opinion goes out of its way to speak disparagingly of the case law in the
area of intergovernmental tax immunities: "A further cautionary note is
sounded, however, by the Court's experience in the related field of state
immunity from federal taxation."''
According to Garcia, the cases involving state immunity from federal
Supremacy 9-10 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Jackson II], for a discussion of the idea that
an arbiter between the national government and the states is a necessity.
146. J. Acton, Acton-Creighton Correspondence, in Essays on Freedom and Power 335-
36 (1972) (letter to Mandell Creighton dated April 15, 1887).
147. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1026 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
148. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1570, at
429-31 (1833).
149. See Jackson II, supra note 145, at 17-22 (Supreme Court arbiter of conflicts be-
tween states and national government).
150. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 521 (1859). See also South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) ("To preserve the even balance between [state
and federal] governments and hold each in its separate sphere is the peculiar duty of all
courts, preeminently of this.").
151. 105 S. Ct. at 1012.
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taxation never developed "a consistent formulation of the kinds of [state]
functions that were entitled to immunity." 2 The case law on the matter
was, however, not nearly as confused as Garcia indicates. On the con-
trary, the decisions during this century have followed a relatively consis-
tent pattern in determining whether tax immunity should be granted.
The starting point of the law of intergovernmental tax immunities is
McCulloch v. Maryland.'53 The wholesale federal immunity recognized
there also had implications for state immunity. Under Collector v.
Day, 5 4 it was assumed that there was a reciprocal immunity in the
states, which fully protected the states from federal taxation. Collector v.
Day was, of course, overruled155 and its theory that a tax on income was
a tax on its governmental source relegated to the constitutional dustbin.
The areas of private tax immunity erected under that theory have been
completely eliminated.' 56 But that has not meant the subjection of the
states to unrestricted federal taxing power. The Collector v. Day assump-
tion of equivalent state and federal immunity now appears unwarranted.
Yet the cases until now have recognized that there is still some state
immunity-based not on a categorical constitutional command like the
supremacy clause but "judicially implied from the States' role in the con-
stitutional scheme."'
157
In Massachusetts v. United States,' the most recent pre-Garcia case
on the subject, the Court indicated that, for purposes of state tax immu-
nity, there is a line between a "taxing measure... to preclude the States
from performing essential functions"' 59 and one that "may tax revenue-
generating activities of the States that are of the same nature as those
traditionally engaged in by private persons.""
152. Id.
153. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall laid down a
broad principle of immunity for federal agencies from state taxation. See id. at 435-37.
For a recent discussion, see United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459-62
(1977).
154. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
155. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939) ("Collector V.
Day [and other cases] are overruled so far as they recognize an implied constitutional
immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or
a state government or their instrumentalities."). See also 1 N. Redlich & B. Schwartz,
Constitutional Law § 2.04, at 2-62 to -63 (1983) (Collector r. Day assumption of equiva-
lence in intergovernmental tax immunities unwarranted).
156. See Jackson II, supra note 145, at 243-44 (Court disposed of doctrine of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity insofar as it protected public officials from taxation).
157. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 455 (1978).
158. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
159. Id. at 458.
160. Id. at 457. Although leaving the traditional line untouched, the Court used lan-
guage stressing the importance of the federal interest. After noting that cases had in-
creasingly come to limit states' immunity from federal taxation, see id. at 458-59, the
Court indicated that unless a revenue measure interferes with traditional state activities,
it will be upheld. "Where the subject of tax is a natural and traditional source of federal
revenue and where it is inconceivable that such a revenue measure could ever operate to
preclude traditional state activities, the tax is valid." Id. at 459-60. In addition, in a
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On one side of the line is a tax on state property used to perform a so-
called "essential" state function:
[W]e could hardly say that a general non-discriminatory real estate tax
(apportioned), or an income tax laid upon citizens and States alike
could be constitutionally applied to the State's capitol, its State-house,
its public school houses, public parks, or its revenues from taxes or
school lands, even though all real property and all income of the citi-
zen is taxed. 16 1
As Justice Frankfurter explained it, "Only a State can own a Statehouse
... [It] could not be included for purposes of federal taxation in any
abstract category of taxpayers without taxing the State as a State.' ' 62
On the other side of the line is a tax on mineral water bottled and sold
by a state 63 or a tax on a state-run liquor business. I4 Such a tax is valid
because, by such a tax, "Congress generally taps a source of revenue by
whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a
State [and] the Constitution of the United States does not forbid it merely
because its incidence falls also on a State."'' 65
It is true that the Court has at times unduly stressed semantics in de-
ciding tax immunity cases, stating that the line in these cases was that
between "governmental" and "proprietary"'' 66 functions and later assert-
ing that the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" func-
tions was "untenable.""16 In practice, nevertheless, the line stated in
Massachusetts v. United States6 has proved workable; under it, state
immunity does not extend to activities not essential for the preservation
of state government. "The true distinction is between the attempted tax-
ation of those operations of the States essential to the execution of its
governmental functions, and which the State can only do itself, and those
activities which are of a private character."'' 69 Massachusetts v. United
States,'70 though recognizing federal power to impose user fees that re-
quire states to pay their fair share of the cost of federal programs from
harbinger of the Garcia decision, the Court focused on the makeup of Congress as one
reason for limiting the immunity. "The Congress, composed as it is of members chosen
by state constituencies, constitutes an inherent check against the possibility of abusive
taxing of the States by the National Government." Id. at 456.
161. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587-88 (1946) (Stone, C.J., concurring).
162. Id. at 582.
163. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
164. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
165. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
166. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1013.
167. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946). The Court used the gov-
ernmental/proprietary or private business distinction on several occasions. See, e.g., Al-
len v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439, 443, 452 (1938) (Georgia's revenues from admission charges
to athletic events are not immune from federal taxation); South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905) (liquor business not a governmental function).
168. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
169. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911).
170. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
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which they benefit,"' left the line of state immunity from other taxes
untouched.
Now Garcia casts doubt on all the state tax immunity cases because it
asserts that the tax cases, like those involving regulatory immunity, have
been based on an "unworkable" distinction. 7 2 Here too, state immunity
as a judicially enforceable doctrine must be abandoned. The implication
is that there is no longer any state immunity from federal action. A fed-
eral tax on an essential state function-even a property tax on the State
capitol-is not subject to constitutional attack. The states must depend
on the political process to protect them from federal levies--even those
taxing "the State as a State." '173
D. Discrimination as a Limit
The statute involved in both National League of Cities and Garcia was
the Fair Labor Standards Act.174 As originally enacted, its wage and
hour requirements were binding only on private employers.' 75 The 1974
amendments at issue in both cases extended those requirements to the
states as employers.1 7 6 What would have happened, however, if Con-
gress had imposed the wage and hour requirements only on the states as
employers?
From the language alone of Justice Blackmun's Garcia opinion, it
would appear that this type of federal infringement on the states is be-
yond judicial control. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Court would
maintain its hands-off posture in the face of a discriminatory law that
applies its regulatory prescriptions only to the states-and without con-
sidering what state functions are affected by the law.
In New York v. United States,'77 the Court upheld a federal tax on
mineral waters bottled and sold by a state. 7 Though the Court split
sharply on the constitutional approach to the tax which the state had to
pay,'7 9 all the majority Justices stressed that the tax was one which ap-
171. Id. at 461-62.
172. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1014.
173. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
174. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), amended by Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (99 Stat.) 787).
175. The original Act specifically excluded the states and their subdivisions from its
coverage:
'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or
any State or political subdivision of a State ....
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (emphasis
added).
176. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)). See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
177. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
178. See id. at 574-75.
179. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Rut-
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plied equally to all mineral water sales and that they would have reached
a different result had the tax been imposed only on states engaged in the
mineral water business and not on private persons so engaged. "Conced-
edly," wrote Chief Justice Stone, "a federal tax discriminating against a
State would be an unconstitutional exertion of power over a coexisting
sovereignty within the same framework of government."' ° This means,
Justice Rutledge explained, "that state functions may not be singled out
for taxation when others performing them are not taxed or for special
burdens when they are."
18 1
It is difficult to believe that even the Garcia majority would have up-
held the law if it had imposed its wage and hour requirements only on
the states and not on private employers as well. Despite Garcia then,
discrimination should remain an enforceable limitation on congressional
power to impose commerce clause regulations or taxes on the states. If
Congress ever singles out state functions for regulation or taxation, the
Court should follow the view expressed in New York v. United States and
intervene, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Garcia. Garcia
itself stressed that the state "faces nothing more than the same mini-
mum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of other
employers, public as well as private, have to meet."' 82 A federal law im-
posing obligations only on state employers would present an entirely dif-
ferent case.
CONCLUSION
In his Garcia dissent, Justice Powell asserted that the Court's holding
was contrary to the doctrine of judicial review established by Marbury v.
Madison:8 3  "In rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the
States from federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explana-
tion for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our history."'8 4
ledge, was concerned with the possibility of imposing taxes discriminating against the
states, and stated that "so long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whom-
soever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution
of the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a State."
Id. at 582.
Chief Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Reed, Murphy and
Burton, pointed out that a federal tax, which is not discriminatory as to a particular
subject matter, might affect a state in a way that would "interfere unduly with the State's
performance of its sovereign functions of government." Id. at 587. He posited that a
non-discriminatory tax on real estate could be applied to the State's capitol, statehouse or
public schools and in such an instance, an additional layer of analysis would be necessary.
The Court would be required to examine "whether such a non-discriminatory tax unduly
interferes with the performance of the State's functions of government." Id. at 588. If it
does interfere, the tax's non-discriminatory nature will not save it. Id.
180. Id. at 586 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
181. Id. at 584-85 (Rutledge, J., concurring). See also id. at 581 (Frankfurter's view
that the States may only be taxed in the absence of discrimination).
182. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
183. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
184. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1027 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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All the accepted requirements for justiciability were met in Garcia.
There was plainly a "case" or "controversy" in the Article III sense;185
the plaintiffs had standing; 8 6 the requirement of ripeness was met;""7 and
the case did not present a political question' 88 -at least not in the usual
meaning of the term. Despite this, the Court held that the judiciary
could not decide whether a federal law violated "the limits on Congress'
authority to regulate the States under the Commerce Clause."'I89 Garcia
did not deny that there are constitutional limits on the commerce clause;
it only denied the judicial role in determining those limits.
Such a holding is so "inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
our constitutional system"' 90 that more than a "modest doubt"'' may
be expressed on both its correctness and durability. The correctness of
the holding has already been questioned in this Article. 9 2 The sine qua
non of our constitutional system is its rejection of the doctrine that
"political officials . . . are the sole judges of the limits of their own
power."' 93 Yet that is exactly the result under Garcia in cases involving
claimed infringements by federal action on the states. Instead of judicial
review, the states are left only with the "safeguard" of Congressional self-
restraint.
185. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court defined the term "case or
controversy:"
In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.
Id. at 95.
186. The most frequently used definition of standing is found in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962):
Have the [parties] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing. It is, of
course, a question of federal law.
Id. at 204. Standing can be demonstrated, among other ways, by a showing of injury in
fact, see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970),
some form of personal interest, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.. 426 U.S.
26, 39 (1976), or even the possibility of noneconomic harm, see Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
187. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972) ("Problems of
prematurity and abstractness may well present 'insuperable obstacles' to the exercise of
the Court's jurisdiction, even though that jurisdiction is technically present.") (quoting
Reserve Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 574 (1947)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
502-08 (1961) (Court will not decide cases where there is no immediacy).
188. See B. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 153-57.
189. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016.
190. Id. at 1026 (Powell, J., dissenting).
191. William Shakespeare, The History of Troilus and Cressida, Act II, scene 2, line
15.
192. See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text.
193. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1026 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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According to Garcia, however, that safeguard is made effective by the
states' role in the selection of the federal political branches. The "struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself" is thus "relied on to insulate the
interests of the States."' 9 4 But that subjects constitutional protections to
the inconstancies of the ever-changing political climate-the very thing
that judicial review was intended to avoid. Garcia points to the increas-
ing ability of the states to secure federal grants, particularly for mass-
transit systems, 195 as demonstrating the "effectiveness of the federal
political process in preserving the States' interests."'' 96 As this is being
written, however, the proposed federal budget provides for drastically
reduced federal aid to the states, including the elimination of revenue
sharing and cuts in transit subsidies. 197 "Trust the Congressl" is hardly
enough to protect the states from federal legislators who look on them
with a more hostile eye than the Garcia opinion anticipated.
A more important question is that of durability of the Garcia decision.
Three of the dissenting Justices 198 asserted their belief that Garcia would
be of short duration and that, in Justice Rehnquist's words, "[the Na-
tional League of Cities] principle ... will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court."' 19 9 Whether Rehn-
quist's prophecy becomes reality will depend, in large part, on the future
composition of the Supreme Court. If President Reagan replaces one or
more Justices of the Garcia majority, the Garcia life-span may prove even
shorter than that of National League of Cities.
Yet, even if the scenario of Reagan-appointed Justices does not materi-
alize, it is doubtful that the Garcia rejection of review power over con-
gressional infringements on the states will be followed by future Courts.
Despite Garcia, the doctrine of no-review will give way when a federal
law singles out the states for regulation or taxation. Leaving matters to
the political process will not suffice where Congress uses its powers to
discriminate against the states. °°
In other cases involving federal laws imposing constraints on the
states, it may also be questioned whether the Garcia rebuff to judicial
review will set the future constitutional theme. Constitutional limita-
tions without judicial enforcement are but empty words. "What is [a]
194. Id. at 1018.
195. See id. at 1019-20.
196. Id. at 1018.
197. Federal aid as a percentage of state-local revenue has declined substantially under
the Reagan administration. In 1980, federal aid equaled 31.7 percent of state-local reve-
nue; by 1984, this figure had fallen to 23.7 percent. See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985, at
A14, col. 5 (excerpted from study published by Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, an independent governmental agency).
198. In an opinion in which Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined, Justice O'Connor
indicated her view that "this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsi-
bility." Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Rehnquist also espoused this view. See id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
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right?" asked Justice Story in an early case. "That which may be en-
forced in a Court of Justice."2"1 That is even more true of constitutional
rights than of other rights. If, as the Garcia opinion recognizes, there are
limits on federal action affecting the states,20 2 those limits are meaning-
less if they cannot be enforced by the courts.
This does not necessarily mean that National League of Cities will be
restored to pre-Garcia status. The Court may reclaim its review power in
certain cases but still uphold federal regulation in cases such as National
League of Cities and Garcia. It can do this by following the posture of
extreme deference toward exercises of the commerce power prevailing
between the Jones & Laughlin2"3 and National League of Cities cases.
This approach would subject federal statutes imposing regulations on the
states to judicial review. But virtually all would be upheld under the
deferential approach toward the commerce power displayed by the Court
since Jones & Laughlin.2' Judicial deference would uphold challenged
action under the commerce clause regardless of whether the states, as
well as private persons engaged in the same activities, are being regu-
lated. This would bring us back to the law as stated by the Court in
1936: "But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate
commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been
authorized by Congress than can an individual.,
215
The difficulty with such an approach is that, much as Garcia itself, it
infringes unduly on the state autonomy so essential to the workings of
our federalism. A more moderate approach, giving greater weight to the
values inherent in federalism and yet not fully reinstating National
League of Cities, is to return to the law as it stood under Maryland v.
Wirtz 2°0 -the case that National League of Cities overruled.
Maryland v. Wirtz upheld an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act" imposing its wage and hour requirements on employees of state-
operated schools and hospitals.20 8 The decision was based on the follow-
ing principle stated by the Court: "If a State is engaging in economic
201. Comegys & Pettit v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828).
202. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
203. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
204. The Court used a rational basis test to determine whether Congress had a suffi-
cient justification for finding that a particular regulatory scheme was necessary to protect
interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). For a discussion of cases
in which the Court held that Congress had demonstrated this rational basis, see supra
notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
205. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
206. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
207. Id. at 194-95.
208. In 1966, Congress added to the list of enterprises covered by the Act those
... engaged in the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in
the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the
premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physically handicapped or




activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when en-
gaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation."2 9 The distinction is between functions
which only a state as a government can perform and those which can
also be performed by private persons.
This distinction is also fundamental in tax immunity cases.210 It might
easily have been used by the Court in National League of Cities to distin-
guish that case from Maryland v. Wirtz. As the National League of Cities
opinion recognized, "[T]here are obvious differences between the schools
and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments af-
fected here.", 21' The Court did not, however, base its decision on these
"obvious differences." Instead, it overruled Wirtz,2" 2 refusing to distin-
guish between federal regulations governing state and local agencies such
as police and fire departments and regulations, such as those in Wirtz,
implicating only schools and hospitals.
If the Court returns to Wirtz, the test will be whether the state is per-
forming a function which only a government performs. This test is simi-
lar to that used in tax cases and would immunize core state functions
from federal regulation or taxation, thus preserving the essentials of state
autonomy while not going to the National League of Cities extreme.
At present, so soon after Garcia, it is nearly impossible to predict
which approach will eventually be followed by the Court. Indeed, it is
risky to even attempt to prophesy in this area. Few authors are as rash
as those who venture into print with attempts to forecast coming consti-
tutional developments. As a newspaper once described my own effort to
predict future Supreme Court tendencies, "He would be on much safer
ground trying to forecast the winner of the 1958 Kentucky Derby, for
which nominations have not even been made as yet." '2 13
All that can be said with any confidence is that the Garcia abdication
of review power will ultimately be repudiated. A constitutional house
divided against itself also cannot stand. Judicial review is so basic to our
system that it must again take its place in cases involving federal infringe-
ments on the states, as it does in other cases. In these cases, as in others
in which constitutionality is at issue, one may share the Garcia dissent-
ers' belief "that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional
responsibility" 21 -"to say what the law is." '2 15
29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1982).
At the same time, Congress amended the definition of "employer" by removing the
exemption of States and their political subdivisions with respect to employees of hospi-
tals, institutions and schools. See id. § 203(d).
209. 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968).
210. See supra notes 151-71 and accompanying text.
211. 426 U.S. at 855.
212. See id.
213. The Court Confuses A Noted Professor, Shreveport Times, July 13, 1957, at Four-
A, col. 2. (editorial).
214. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
215. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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